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1. Introduction 
Recent research finds that political parties, in spite of the waning of the political relevance of 
social class and religion, continue to appeal to social groups to sustain, increase or regain 
electoral support. Thau’s (2018, 2019) content analysis of party programs reports that 
political parties in the United Kingdom and Denmark never stopped addressing social groups, 
but replaced class appeals with appeals to ‘non-economic groups’ (as opposed to ‘economic 
groups’). Hersh and Schaffner’s (2013) and Holman et al. (2015)’s experiments show the 
potential electoral benefits and pitfalls when political parties become very (perhaps overly) 
specific in to which groups they appeal (as in ‘micro-targeting’ and ‘identity-based appeals’, 
respectively). Relatedly, Abou-Chadi and Wagner’s (2019) analysis of broad party manifesto 
data and electoral outcomes demonstrates that left political parties can benefit electorally 
from specific policy appeals (like ‘social investment’) that are attractive to very well-defined 
social groups, but also that such proposals may put off their traditional working-class voters. 
 We contribute to this literature by presenting a new dataset on party-political 
appeals in Scandinavia. The dataset contains comprehensive information on group and 
policy appeals at a much greater level of detail than the Comparative Manifesto Data indices 
offer. This allows us to identify empirically and specify more precisely a) which groups 
political parties actually appeal to, b) to what extent parties indeed target well-defined social 
groups with their broad policy appeals, and c) what targeted policy packages parties offer 
with such policy appeals. With the new data we can also shed light on a so far neglected 
issue, namely the extent to which group appeals are substantial and meaningful. Substantial 
and meaningful appeals are appeals to social groups that – in addition to mentioning a 
specific social group – spell out the policy goal(s) for the specified social group and cite the 
policy instruments to reach the goal(s). 
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The dataset contains detailed information on 595 Scandinavian party appeals to 
social groups, the explicit aims or goals of the policies that parties describe, and the 
measures and means (instruments) parties mention for reaching these goals. 
 We organize our discussion of the various theoretical perspectives on parties and 
social groups and our presentation of the dataset around three guiding questions: 
- which groups do parties explicitly appeal to? 
- how substantial and meaningful are these appeals? 
- to what extent do parties differ in their (meaningful) appeals? 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a stylized review of the 
relevant approaches and theories. We distinguish seven analytically different models that 
we order according to how specific they theorize parties’ group appeals to be. The 
theoretical spectrum ranges from the realignment/constrained partisan model (conjecturing 
very specific group appeals; Beramendi et al., 2015; Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015) to the 
cartel-party model (postulating no group appeals whatsoever; e.g., Mair, 2013). In Section 3, 
we justify why we concentrate our data gathering efforts on Scandinavian political parties. 
Crucial for our purposes is that the two models at both ends of the theoretical spectrum just 
mentioned single out Scandinavia as the most likely case for their contradictory propositions 
to be, or to come, true. This methodological choice makes it necessary to zoom in on the 
uniqueness of Scandinavian politics, in particular the role of the universal welfare state and 
the pivotal role of one particular social group, namely the middle-class, in generating robust 
support for universalism. In the period we cover (2009–2015, see below), voters in Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark consistently ranked topics related to the welfare state (e.g., “welfare”, 
healthcare, elderly care, education) as the most important political issues (Sweden: 
Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 177; Norway: Karlsen 2015: 36; Denmark: Stubager et al. 
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2016: 20). In Section 3, we also offer arguments why political parties might need to adjust 
their appeals to social groups in their response to the challenge that middle-class voters 
might not indefinitely maintain their historical backing of the universal welfare state. 
The theoretical considerations of the literature, our considerations on case selection 
and our take on Scandinavian politics then form the background of our exploratory and 
descriptive data presentation in Section 4. We present our method, data and findings, 
mapping which social groups parties in Scandinavia appeal to and listing whether these 
appeals are accompanied by a specification of policy goals and instruments. Because of the 
exploratory nature of our study, we allowed for a certain empirically oriented openness and 
broadness in the coding of groups and the content of appeals. Anticipating our presentation 
below, we find that political parties still appeal, and very often in a substantial and 
meaningful way, to social groups, but not quite in the way political science theories of 
political parties would lead us to expect. The concluding Section 5 reviews these findings and 
considers the issue of generalizability. 
 
2. Theories on political parties and social group appeals 
The literature on political parties has provided a wide range of theoretically informed, but 
often contradictory, propositions on political parties and group appeals. To organize our 
review of the relevant theoretical perspectives, we first selected approaches that could offer 
us an indication about how parties appeal to social groups. Our selection criterion was the 
following: does this theoretical perspective have something to say about how parties appeal 
to social groups or not? We found that no less than seven theoretical approaches can be 
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argued to make more or less definite statements about social-group targeting. 0F1  To reduce 
complexity and ease the presentation of the various perspectives, we then ordered the 
approaches according to how specific they theorize parties’ group appeals to be (guiding 
question 1), adding information on how meaningful and substantial the theory expects such 
appeals to be (guiding question 2) and summarizing the extent to which parties are expected 
to differ in their (meaningful) appeals (guiding question 3). We present a stylized review of 
the various theoretical approaches in the order as visualized in Table 1. 
 1. The Constrained Partisan Perspective (Beramendi et al., 2015) posits that the social 
structure and the associated distribution of policy preferences are very complex and cannot 
be captured by any simple one- or two-dimensional (e.g., economic left-right and value-
oriented) representation of  electoral politics. Divisions of economic sectors, occupations 
and skills are politically relevant because they affect policy preferences of four explicitly 
identified groups: sociocultural professionals, business-finance professionals, low-skilled 
workers and the petty bourgeoisie. Parties can only respond to their preferences in a 
constrained manner due to existing policy legacies and the feedback effects of the 
institutional set-up in which they operate. Moreover, coalition opportunities depend on the 
relative size of the electoral groups. This perspective would lead us to expect electoral 
manifestos to refer explicitly to such groups or offer policy packages that provide the glue 
for an electoral coalition between groups (e.g., social investment to forge a coalition 
between sociocultural professionals and business-finance professionals). The Constrained 
 
1 To avoid confusion, we wish to explain why we do not draw on pledge research. Appeals are conceptually 
different from pledges, although there are party statements that fall into both categories. An appeal mentions 
a group. It does not need to include an aim or an instrument, but can do so. It can even be retrospective. By 
contrast, the standard definitions (Royed, 1996: 79; Thomson et al., 2012: 12; Naurin, 2014: 1051) that also 
inform the Comparative Party Pledge Project define a pledge as a future-oriented commitment to take action, 
to refrain from doing something or to achieve an outcome, sometimes at a certain time. A pledge can refer to a 
group, but does not need to do so.  By contrast, for a group appeal, neither future orientation nor testability is 
a necessary feature. 
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Table 1. Theories of political parties and social group appeals, arranged according to specificity of 
group appeals 
 Group appeals:  
How specific? 
Which groups? 
Policy appeals: 
Are aims and/or instruments 
specified? 
Convergence on groups 
and/or policies? 
Theoretical approach  
1. 
Realignment/Constra
ined Partisanship 
Perspective  
 
Very specific 
Sociocultural professionals, 
business-finance 
professionals, low-skilled 
workers; petty bourgeoisie 
 
Yes, concrete policy packages 
to forge coalitions between 
groups 
No 
2. Power Resources 
Model 
Specific 
Socio-economic class: 
workers/labour; 
affluent/bourgeoisie  
Yes, concrete with clear class 
gradient in proposed policies 
No 
3. Winners & Losers 
of Globalization 
Perspective 
 
Somewhat specific  
Groups at the intersection of 
economic and cultural issues 
positively and negatively 
affected by globalization 
Yes, concrete policies for both 
losers and winners of 
globalization 
No, divergence due to 
new cleavage 
4. Median Voter 
Model 
Somewhat unspecific in terms 
of groups other than ‘median 
voters’, but sometimes 
implying ‘middle class’ 
Yes, but shifting towards the 
median 
Yes, policy convergence 
towards median voter’s 
preferences 
5. Catch-all Party 
Model 
Somewhat unspecific cross 
class appeal, targeting all 
groups 
No concrete policies, low 
ideological penetration, broad 
appeals 
Yes, in the sense of 
diffuse group and policy 
appeals 
6. Responsible Party 
Model 
Unspecific Concrete policy proposals for 
different groups in party 
platforms 
Yes, with respect to 
group appeals; no with 
respect to policies 
7. Cartel Party Model Very unspecific No meaningful party 
competition via distinctive 
aims/instruments in 
manifestos 
Yes 
 
 
Partisan Perspective typically expects parties to realign, bringing together very specific 
groups in hybrid electoral coalitions (e.g., Gingrich and Häusermann, 2015).  
2. The Power Resources Model modernizes the largely outdated traditional class-cleavage 
approach as pioneered by Lipset and Rokkan (1967).  According to this model, political 
parties still appeal to social groups, although they can no longer be considered to be direct 
representatives of major social groups. The long-term and stable structuring of electorates  
has gradually given way to different forms of voter-party linkages and party competition. 
The consequence is dramatically higher levels of electoral volatility and party-system de-
7 
institutionalization (Chiaramonte and Emanuele, 2017). Yet, the Power Resources Model 
holds that economic class still drives individual preference formation, party allegiance and 
the policy outputs of governments (e.g., Korpi and Palme, 2003). According to the model, we 
should still find a left-right gradient in group and policy appeals, with left parties catering to 
the economically disadvantaged, right parties appealing to affluent groups. 
3. The Winners & Losers of Globalization Perspective (Kriesi et al. 2008: 154-182; 2012) 
posits that globalization has produced a new socio-structural conflict between ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’ of globalization. Parties, in particular right-wing populist ones, have adjusted to this 
by downplaying economic issues in favour of issues along the cultural dimension, stressing 
anti-immigration and anti-European integration. (Social) policy proposals should reflect this 
new conflict dimension and address social groups that are (positively or negatively) affected 
by globalization. 
4. The Median Voter Model posits that all parties appeal to the same segments of society 
(Downs, 1957; Grofman, 2004). Assuming a unimodal preference distribution, the model 
predicts that (two) parties converge towards the position of the median voter and that there 
are strong incentives for parties to appeal to middle-class voters. The model’s assumptions 
regarding the structure of party competition are less fitting in multiparty systems than in 
two-party systems (see Iversen and Goplerud, 2018), but given the pivotal role of middle-
class politics in both such systems, it is hard to imagine that parties do not appeal to the 
middle-class voter at all. Therefore, the model would lead us to expect that middle-class 
appeals still play a role despite the declining relevance of the traditional cleavage structure 
and the waning of the mass political party that represents social groups. 
5. Slightly different yet related to the expectation of middle-class appeals in party programs 
is the Catch-all Model, according to which parties try to appeal to all groups in society 
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simultaneously (Kirchheimer, 1965; Krouwel, 2003). Kirchheimer saw the gradual 
programmatic approximation of the German and Austrian social-democratic and 
conservative parties after the Second World War as an example of the (dealignment-
induced) trend of milieu-specific mass integration and membership parties turning into 
catch-all parties. As a cross-class vote-maximization strategy, catch-all parties trade 
‘ideological penetration’ for ‘quick electoral success’ (Kirchheimer, 1965: 27). The 
implication is that parties include very broad and uncontroversial appeals in their manifestos 
without being specific, leading to largely de-ideologized competition.  
6. The responsible party model (Klingemann et al., 1994) holds that the main role of parties 
is not to represent social groups, but to produce clear political visions and policy proposals in 
party manifestos. These ‘party platforms’ are presented to voters at elections, and the 
electorate then decides which party (or coalitions of parties) gets the opportunity to execute 
its platform. At subsequent elections, voters are assumed to evaluate the party’s past 
performance and appraise the party’s new vision and policy proposals for the future. Parties 
should be responsive to voters’ policy preferences if they are interested in winning elections 
and governing based on their platform. The model is agnostic about the specific policy 
contents and group–party links, but assumes that clear and different proposals are a 
prerequisite for appealing to the electorate. Hence, this model would lead us to expect that 
to the extent that parties appeal to groups at all, they do so in an unspecific and indirect 
way. In their manifestos, parties make different policy proposals that leave it to the groups 
themselves to infer whether they will benefit or lose from these proposals. 
7. We conclude our review with the Cartel Party Model, which posits that any link between 
social groups and political parties has been severed (Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009). Modern 
political parties have evolved from mass social representation organizations, via responsive 
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and representative parties mediating between citizens and the state, to so-called cartel 
parties characterized by ‘the interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards 
inter-party collusion’ (Katz and Mair, 2009: 755). Self-referential cartel parties are not 
interested in offering policy instruments, solutions or substantial competition. As Mair 
(2013: 1) put it: ‘The age of party democracy has passed. Although the parties themselves 
remain, they have become so disconnected from the wider society, and pursue a form of 
competition that is so lacking in meaning, that they no longer seem capable of sustaining 
democracy in its present form’. In sum, the model leads us to expect that party manifestos 
hardly differ and contain very few, if any, references to specific social groups. Parties remain 
diffuse and put little, if any, emphasis on concrete policy proposals or solutions to practical 
problems. 
 
Admittedly, our stylized review of the various approaches to how political parties appeal to 
social groups does not do justice to the richness and sophistication of the theoretical 
frameworks. We also readily concede that we neglect implications that the theories point to 
that do not concern group appeals. The justification of our procedure is that it was meant to 
give us some indication of how theories expect parties to appeal to social groups (or not) 
and how they do so. This information then guides the presentation of our dataset on group 
and policy appeals. Before we present our dataset, we need to explain and justify why we 
focus on political parties in Scandinavia and on welfare state issues. 
 
3. Why Scandinavian Political Parties and Why Welfare State Issues? 
We concentrate our data gathering efforts on Scandinavian political parties, because the two 
opposite theoretical accounts of party appeals  – the constrained party model and the cartel-
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party theory (Table 1; see Section 2) – single out Scandinavia as the most likely case for their 
contradictory propositions to be, or to come, true. 
The Cartel Party Model posits that if anywhere, it is in Scandinavia that cartelization 
is most likely to occur. Due to the interwovenness between political parties and the state in 
Scandinavia, the disconnection between parties and social groups should have advanced 
furthest here (Katz and Mair, 1995: 17; see Lindvall and Rothstein, 2006: 61 and Hagevi and 
Enroth, 2018: 17 on Sweden). This is because ‘a tradition of inter-party cooperation 
combines with a contemporary abundance of state support for parties, and with a privileging 
of party in relation to patronage appointments, offices and so on’ (Katz and Mair, 1995: 17). 
Interestingly, the constrained partisanship literature (Beramendi et al., 2015: 33-35) 
also singles out the Scandinavian political systems as most likely to have developed new, 
politically relevant occupational groups, such as sociocultural professionals, to which 
political parties increasingly appeal and with the support of whom they seek new political 
realignments. Sociocultural professionals have replaced the working class and its 
organizations as the core electoral constituency of social democracy in Scandinavia. 
However, all parties that wish to compete need to cater to this group and seek alignment 
between these – mostly state-affiliated – professionals, organized labour and business. 
Scandinavia is thus, from this perspective, an optimal case for scrutinizing claims about 
whether parties (still) appeal to social groups in a meaningful way, but with an entirely 
opposite expectation from the one formulated in the cartelization model. 
 Accepting Scandinavia as a most likely case begs the question of what is special about 
Scandinavian politics and Scandinavian political parties. The answer is the universal welfare 
state, whose political viability depends on the support of voters of various social and 
economic backgrounds and a broad coalition of political parties across the political spectrum 
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(Hedegaard, 2015). In comparison to other types of welfare states, the broad adhesion to 
universalism, including among middle-class voters, stands out in Scandinavia (see Jensen and 
van Kersbergen, 2017).  
The inclusion of middle-class voters in universal and redistributive social policy 
programs implied that they could benefit too. Material self-interest goes a long way in 
explaining this social group’s support for the welfare state, whereas the electoral weight and 
pivotal significance of middle-class voters prompted political actors from left to right to be 
very attentive and responsive to its wishes. Moreover, middles-class voters demanded 
expansion of the welfare state, not just quantitatively, but above all qualitatively. Finally, 
once in place, the state with its massive service-delivering public sector became the largest 
provider of – typically professional, bureaucratic middle-class – jobs. In other words, an 
inclusive, universal welfare state required high-quality and extensive provisions and good 
middle-class jobs, lest the market and the private sector become the most attractive place to 
seek an alternative to universal provisions (and high taxes) and public sector jobs (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
The socially and politically inclusive universal welfare state had an unintended effect: 
the generosity and high quality of the provisions – demanded by the middle class in return 
for support for the welfare state – extended, by implication of universalism, to less fortunate 
social groups. The combination of universalism, particularly in pensions and healthcare, and 
the considerable size of the public social budget produced the ‘paradox of redistribution’: 
the big and generous welfare states that also provide for the non-needy middle-class voters 
are more redistributive than those that spend public money exclusively on the 
underprivileged (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Hence, political parties operating in the universal 
welfare state context have tended to appeal broadly and non-exclusively to social groups. It 
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is also for these reasons that a (comparatively speaking) large majority of voters (70 to 80 
per cent) in Scandinavia identify with the ‘middle class’ (Kevins et al., 2019: Figure 1, p. 27). 
Despite massive support for the universal welfare state, there is no guarantee that 
middle-class voters will continue to back it. Changing preferences for social policy and 
redistribution among middle-class voters may have important repercussions for the political 
sustainability of the universal welfare state. We list three main arguments that support the 
expectation that middle-class voters may change their attitude to the universal welfare 
state, forcing parties to adjust their appeals to social groups (Jensen and van Kersbergen, 
2017). 
First, there has always been the risk that the quality of public provision does not live 
up to middle-class standards and expectations. There has always been the supposition that 
the private sector might offer a better deal. This is likely to reinforce voter demands to allow 
private solutions and to reduce taxes to make these affordable. In line with Beramendi et al. 
(2015), there is an increasing risk that middle-class voters are willing to abandon 
universalism. Political parties, if they appeal to social groups at all, should respond to, or at 
least anticipate, such a change by altering their group appeals. 
Second, to the extent that middle-class voters express preferences for lower taxes 
and private provision, a new window of opportunity opens up for centre-right parties. Such 
parties may now wish to stress a political program to reallocate public means away from 
programs that are less important to middle-class voters (e.g., social assistance) or are better 
handled privately (e.g., private unemployment insurance). Parties should attune their 
appeals to such new circumstances. 
Third, and ironically, the inclusive, collective solutions offered by the universal 
welfare state increasingly clash with the kind of services and provisions demanded by much 
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more individually oriented and emancipated citizens. With major risks collectively and 
comprehensively covered, people demand more individual ‘choice’ and private solutions, 
beyond, instead of, or in addition to those already provided by the universal welfare state. 
Hence, one can expect increasing demands for private healthcare, private education, 
individual care provisions, or private unemployment insurance, and parties should adapt by 
adjusting their appeals. 
 This explains why we focus our explorative data effort on Scandinavian political 
parties and why we limited the coding (broadly conceived, see Table 3) to welfare state-
related issues. With our choice to code welfare policy statements in party manifestos in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden as most likely cases, we gain a double methodological 
advantage: the setup allows us to offer, on the one hand, a preliminary assessment of rival 
theoretical claims and, on the other hand, a reasonable evaluation of the extent to which 
our empirical findings are likely to travel beyond the Scandinavian context. 
 
4. Analysis and results 
We constructed a dataset that covers elections in the period from 2009 to 2015 and codes 
welfare policy statements by all parties represented in the parliaments of Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden. More specifically, we cover the elections in Norway 2009 and 2013 and in 
Sweden 2010 and 2014. As we explain below, we had to use principle programs for the 
Danish parties. This gives us 33 party-year observations. To address our three guiding 
questions (1. which groups do parties explicitly appeal to, 2. how substantial and meaningful 
are the appeals; 3. to what extent do parties converge or differ regarding questions 1 and 2), 
we classified statements on three items: 
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1) To which social groups are parties appealing? For instance, do parties mention specific 
groups as (deserving) recipients of welfare? In line with our explorative task to map parties’ 
appeals, we use a deliberately broad conception of social groups, which can entail 
demographic, ethnic or economic aspects. For instance, we have a category for parents as 
workers, for families, and for workers. The worker category only entails appeals to workers 
primarily as an economic and professional group, whereas the family category is strictly 
family-related. The category ‘parents as workers’ is at the intersection of both dimensions, 
often dealing with the reconciliation of work and family, including the obstacles women face. 
2) What measures and means (instruments) do parties specify in their policy proposals? For 
instance, do parties advocate that more or fewer conditions and obligations be attached to 
social rights and program benefits (for instance, means testing)? 3) What are the explicit 
aims/goals of the policies proposed?  
Table 2 lists all parties studied by country. We coded their party manifestos according 
to the three aspects described above: group mentioned, instrument indicated and aim/goal 
formulated. We chose manifestos because they are comparable, comprehensive and 
carefully crafted textual outputs of parties as collective actors and provide the blueprint for 
the communication in campaigns and for policy choices (Bischof and Senninger, 2017: 6).1F2 
 
2 Danish parties are exceptional because they do not publish electoral manifestos that are similar or 
comparable to what the parties in Sweden and Norway produce. We have tried to solve this problem by 
specifically looking at Socialdemokratiet: ’Principprogram Hånden på hjertet’, 2011; Venstre: ’Principprogram 
Fremtid i frihed og fællesskab’, 2006; Dansk Folkeparti: ’Dansk folkeparti Principprogram’, October 2002, 
’Dansk Folkeparti – Arbejdsprogram’, September 2009, and several brochures that can be found on the 
webpage https://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/; Socialistisk Folkeparti: ’Principprogram’, 2012; Enhedslisten: 
’Enhedslistens principprogram’, 2014; Liberal Alliance: ’Principprogram’ and ’Arbejdsprogram’ (not dated; 
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To stay true to our exploratory ambition, we did not rely on pre-defined Manifesto 
categories and unitized quasi-sentences from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR, 
Volkens et al., 2018). We also considered using MARPOR categories devoted to groups (such 
as ‘labour groups’), but found that they exhibited very low frequencies and included only a 
few groups. We first marked whole sentences or quasi-sentences (i.e., parts of sentences) as 
code-lines for the three categories and then systematically placed them in one of the 
categories. This resulted in country/party overview tables, which we used to write country 
and party summaries. We then translated these data into English and merged them into a 
general overview of all countries and all parties, resulting in a 31-page source table (with 
over 8000 words and 595 appeals) for the analyses presented below. 
Table 2: Political Parties Covered in the Dataset 
Denmark Label Norway  Label Sweden Label 
Socialdemokratiet left Arbeiderpartiet left Socialdemokraterna left 
Venstre centre Høyre right Centerpartiet centre 
Dansk Folkeparti right Fremskrittspartiet right Folkpartiet centre 
Enhedslisten left Sosialistisk Venstreparti left Nya Moderaterna right 
Liberal Alliance centre Kristelig folkeparti centre Sverigedemokraterna right 
Radikale Venstre centre Senterpartiet centre Vänsterpartiet left 
Socialistisk Folkeparti left         
Konservative Folkeparti right         
Alternativet left         
 
To streamline the data and get an overall impression of how parties in Scandinavia appeal to 
groups, which instruments they indicate and what goals they specify, we used the source 
table to create a summary table, identifying synonyms that allowed us to reclassify all group 
 
accessed 18 October 2016 at https://www.liberalalliance.dk/); Det Konservative Folkeparti: ’Giv ansvaret 
tilbage: Det Konservative Folkepartis partiprogam’, September 2012; Alternativet: ’Partiprogram’ (not dated; 
accessed 14 May 2016); Det Radikale Venstre: ’Det Radikale Venstres Principprogram’, February 1997. 
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mentions into fewer and broader categories. These are the 14 groups (13 + a residual 
category) we identified: all, elderly, (labour) immigrants, the weak/needy, families, students, 
working parents, the strong/healthy, youth, workers, social benefit recipients, self-
employed, teachers, and a residual category. The resulting table is still too long to report in 
the text (12 pages; online appendix), but in Table 3 we report a very condensed version, 
primarily to give examples of which synonyms went into the broader group categories, what 
kind of instruments are mentioned, and which goals are specified. Table 3 gives a summary 
overview of the (near-) synonyms and related groups we collapsed into the final 14 group 
categories after the three-stage reduction of the initial 595 group appeals. All steps were 
performed by experts based on raw data collection by student assistants. 
We first discuss some general results and insights gained from this exercise and then 
look at the results from the perspectives of the approaches discussed in Section 2. We 
learned two main things. First, at the level of group mentioning, the category ‘all’ seemed to 
be by far the largest (confirmed below). With regard to the instruments and goals that 
parties formulate when they refer to ‘all’, we noticed that most references are to the 
universalist features of the Scandinavian welfare state: education and healthcare, and what 
we might summarize as an ‘inclusive labour market’ (e.g., full employment, work for all, 
etc.). One tentative conclusion is that – given the broad middle-class nature of Scandinavian 
society we allude to in Section 3 – referring to ‘all’ de facto means referring to the middle 
class. 
Second, we noticed that parties sometimes refer to groups but do not specify a 
particular instrument or goal, implying that some mentions of groups are uncommitted or 
unsubstantiated. For example, it makes a difference whether a party merely states the 
importance of entrepreneurs and the self-employed or whether it also specifies as an  
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Table 3: Group Appeals, Policy Instruments and Aims: Short Summary of the Online Appendix 
Level 1 (groups/mention) Level 2 (instrument) Level 3 (aim) 
All 
• everyone, regardless of …  
• citizens 
• all residents 
• progressive taxation 
• education and work 
• lower taxes 
• free education 
• equal possibilities and solidarity 
• flexible labour market 
• lifelong education 
• work for all 
Elderly 
• elderly over X years 
• pensioners 
• flexible retirement age 
• support 
• housing, better health services 
• more elderly volunteering  
• work longer 
• live home as long as wanted 
(Labor) immigrants 
• minorities 
• foreign workers 
•  get access to work 
• language training 
 
• contribute to society 
• open society 
• equality 
The weak/the needy 
• the vulnerable 
• mentally ill, the disabled  
 
• personal responsibility  
• social benefits 
• support 
• access to healthcare 
•  contribute to society 
• support 
• reduce social differences 
Families 
• next of kin 
• families with … (e.g., children) 
 
• freedom organize family life 
• balance between work and 
family 
• affordable daycare 
• good framework for family life 
• full daycare coverage 
Students 
• students with children 
• students between X and Y years 
• include individual skills 
• education tailored for the 
individual 
• free choice between public or 
private 
• education of high quality 
• develop skills 
• personal development 
Parents (as workers) 
• families who work 
• parents with small children 
• flexible work hours 
• flexible maternity leave 
• possible to combine work and 
family 
• be with their children 
• freedom of choice 
• combine family and work 
• gender equality 
The strong and healthy 
• those with high(est) income 
•  higher taxes, contribution by 
ability 
• fair tax system 
Youth 
• children 
• children in school 
• economic support to education 
• help with homework 
• education for all 
• equal opportunity  
 
Workers 
• employees 
• public employees 
• part-time workers 
• skilled workers 
 
• wages reflect efforts 
• shorter working time 
• right to full-time work 
 
• as many as possible in work 
• better wages and life conditions 
• flexible working hours 
• pay to work 
• right to full-time job 
• equal pay for equal work 
People on social benefits 
• unemployed 
• recipients of social benefits 
• public safety net 
• lower tax on work income 
• (duty to be in) activity 
• combine welfare and work 
• pay to work 
• everyone should contribute 
• work for all 
Self-employed workers 
• companies and self-employed 
• companies 
 
• lower taxes, easier legislation, 
education promoting self-
employment 
• social responsibility 
• create economic growth 
• make it easier to be self-
employed 
Teachers • education • better teachers 
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• researchers 
• young researchers  
• invest in young researchers 
• lower starting salaries 
• effective studies should be 
rewarded 
Rest category 
• Users of public services 
• those without equity 
• both parts in labour market 
• public services consist of good 
basic services 
• higher taxes 
• create own terms 
• equality 
• reduce housing prices 
• flexible labour market 
• increased employment 
 
instrument that business taxes must be lowered to encourage and support innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Since this could be regarded as a partial confirmation of the idea that 
party competition is shallow and devoid of meaning, we used this information to examine 
how substantiated appeals to groups are and whether party families differ in this aspect. We 
found 595 appeals to groups, which we coded into the 14 overall categories listed above. If 
both a policy instrument and a goal were specified, we coded the appeal as substantial. This 
allows us to plot the appeals to groups against how substantial those appeals are and draw a 
distinction between mere group appeals and policy appeals. 
We divided parties according to the left-centre-right trichotomy, using the 
established party-family codes from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR, Volkens 
et al. 2018). Ecological, socialist and social-democratic parties are aggregated as left parties; 
agrarian, Christian-democratic, centre and liberal parties form the centre; conservative and 
right-wing populist parties are aggregated as right parties hereafter. The results for all 
parties irrespective of party label are shown in Panel 1 of Figure 1; the results for left, centre 
and right parties are shown in Panels 2-4, respectively. 
Which groups do parties explicitly appeal to? 
The x-axis in Figure 1 shows the appeals to each group as a (%) share of all the (595) group 
appeals we found. Panel 1 summarizes the results and allows us to compare them with the 
specific results in Panel 2-4 for left, centre, and right parties. A key finding that emerges 
from the figure is that references to all are more frequent than references to any specific  
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Figure 1: Group appeals 
 
 
group, although there is a clear left right gradient. Appeals to all are dominant among left 
(26%) and centre (23%) parties, but right parties use such universalist language much less 
(12%). 
Another key finding is the lower salience of references to specific socio-economic 
status groups when compared to the prominence of life-course and demographic group 
definitions. Almost every party strongly stresses the particular deservingness of the young 
and the (frail) elderly, while the most mentioned unambiguously economic category are 
recipients (of transfers/help). Since the prominence of demography over economic status is 
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one of our main findings and echoes the findings of Thau (2018, 2019), we wanted to ensure 
that this result was not an artefact of how we collapsed or labelled the groups. A year after 
the analysis, we recoded all group appeals according to whether they concerned economic 
groups, life-cycle groups, or both. We did so without being aware in which of the 14 groups 
an appeal was categorized. The result was that 49% of the appeals concerned life-course 
groups, 23% addressed economic groups and the remaining 28% had some elements of both 
(this mostly pertains to the all category). If we break this down by left, centre and right 
partisanship, we find that appeals to demographic groups dominate all three categories. 
However, the dominance is less strong for left parties (40% demographic vs. 28% economic) 
compared to centre (49% vs. 17%) and right (55% vs. 22%) – in line with findings of Evans 
and Tilley (2017, Chapter 6). Even upon reconsidering the way we collapsed the group 
categories to 14, the possible alternatives are within (rather than across) the demographic 
groups. For instance, the category the weak may be disaggregated further, and appeals to 
people with (or relatives of people with) dementia may also speak to the category the 
elderly. If ‘weak’ simply meant ‘poor’, this could undermine the conclusion. However, we 
have a separate group labelled the poor. Vice versa, one could aggregate the categories 
further. Yet the plausible combinations – such as combining families and youth – do not alter 
the impression of a dominance of life-cycle over economic group appeals. 
If we zoom in on the party differences in the appeals to economic groups that we did 
find, the picture is mixed. We find few direct appeals to classes or economic groups in the 
sense that social cleavage or power resources theory leads us to expect. One notable 
exception is that the left parties are more inclined to appeal to workers than centre-right 
parties. However, these differences are often driven by more outspoken smaller parties that 
single out and advocate policies to support more specific economic groups. Examples are the 
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Swedish Left Party, which wants to improve insurance for unemployed people (2010) and 
aims at ‘strengthening the position of the working class’ (2013), or the Swedish Centre Party, 
which repeatedly refers to entrepreneurs as a pivotal group and suggests lowering business 
taxes (2013).  Otherwise, we find many appeals to the weak and vulnerable in general, but 
they are not limited to the left side of the party spectrum, as Panel 4 of Figure 1 shows. In all 
three countries, right and centre-right parties appeal especially to people with low incomes, 
the vulnerable, and the unemployed.  
We did not find explicit references to the middle class either – and even references 
to the middle of society more broadly were rare. For instance, the Left Party in Sweden 
(2013) promises ‘welfare for all’ (Välfärd för alla) but especially emphasizes that the middle 
class should benefit from welfare. Instead, the more general notion that the welfare state 
should benefit all can be found in most party programs, as reflected in the clear dominance 
of the ‘all’ category among left and centre parties in Panels 2 and 3 (this is less true for right 
parties). Virtually all parties combined this idea with the demand that it must ‘pay to work’. 
For all but the socialist left parties – which focus on increasing wages – this means that social 
rights come with the obligation to work and that benefit schemes should not create 
disincentives to work and to ‘contribute’. Again, our interpretation of these findings is that 
‘all’ de facto means middle class in Scandinavian society. 
Surprisingly, references to migrants make up less than 5% of all direct appeals to 
groups – and as Panels 2-4 show, this is true irrespective of partisanship.  
In sum, our answers to guiding question 1 suggest that left, centre, and right parties 
appeal to broad demographic categories rather than class. The next section discusses to 
what extent the appeals are substantial and meaningful. 
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How substantial and meaningful are these appeals? 
The following results are based on the data from our extensive results tables of policy 
goals and instruments (see online appendix; Table 3 presents the summary). The y-axis in the 
figures indicates the percentage share of appeals substantiated with policy instruments and 
policy goals. On average, parties substantiate 63% of their appeals to social groups with 
instruments and goals. There is a slight left-right gradient in the extent to which group 
appeals are substantiated with policy appeals. While left parties mention aims and 
instruments in 67% of the cases and centre parties in 65%, this is only the case for 61% of 
the appeals by right parties. The differences are more pronounced for specific groups that 
right parties often appeal to. For instance, in terms of relative importance, right parties 
prioritize appeals to the weak and the elderly, while such appeals are less pronounced 
among left parties. However, the appeals of right parties to both groups are less often 
substantiated with policy appeals (i.e., policy aims and instruments).  
There is, however, one important exception from this left-right gradient in the 
concreteness of policy-appeals: When discussing guiding question 1, we pointed out that 
appeals to ‘all’ are dominant among left and centre parties, whereas right parties are less 
universalist. However, those fewer appeals to ‘all’ by right parties are more specific (>60%) 
than the appeals of left parties (50%) and in particular compared to the appeals of centre 
parties (<40%). Notwithstanding this exception, the left-right gradient suggests that group 
appeals by parties characterized as populist right are less often combined with concrete 
policy ideas. Given that three out of five right parties we look at are right-wing populist 
parties, this lower degree of substantiated appeals matches findings about the (electorally 
successful) very simple language of populists (Bischof and Senninger, 2017).  
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 In terms of the actually proposed policy measures and aims, based on a close 
reading of our results in Table 3 and the underlying original (not condensed and translated) 
results tables, we still find concrete proposals and positions. In particular, there are four 
positions that are shared so widely across parties that one can speak of a welfare state 
consensus. This is particularly true if we look at the mainstream parties. Most notably, and in 
line with the findings of recent studies (collected in Edling 2019), Scandinavian centre-right 
parties are hard to distinguish from their social-democratic competitors with regard to 
welfare state rhetoric. In line with the implications of the catch-all proposition, we can 
decipher four statements around which parties converge: First, virtually all parties promise 
to make work pay (again), often in tandem with calls for activation or warnings against 
overly generous schemes. Improving the wage level is a less common aim. A second very 
popular and consensual aspect that parties address is customized healthcare, i.e., the right 
(or freedom) to choose between (state-financed) market solutions and classic public options. 
Third, Scandinavian parties across the ideological spectrum stress the importance of 
education and lifelong learning to prepare people for the knowledge economy. More 
specifically, when we recoded all appeals according to whether they conform to the idea of 
social investment, we found that almost half of the appeals have a social investment focus 
(although the three right-wing populist parties we looked at devoted only every third appeal 
to social investment). Finally, a fourth aspect around which most of the party programs 
revolve concerns (the creation of) better jobs. Overall, this welfare-state consensus 
interpretation is in line with other findings and claims about the strong homogeneity of party 
rhetoric in Scandinavia in general (Groß and Rotholz, 2003 for Norway, Edling 2019 for the 
Nordic countries, Horn and van Kersbergen 2019 for social investment). 
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Based on Kriesi et al., we argued that parties, in particular right-wing populist parties, 
should adjust by downplaying economic issues in favour of cultural issues, stressing anti-
immigration, anti-European integration and welfare chauvinism sentiments. The data we 
collected on the level of direct mentions of groups, policy measures and policy aims confirm 
this for the Danish People’s Party, the Norwegian Progress Party and the Sweden Democrats. 
For example, the Sweden Democrats (2010) want to make provision of healthcare and care 
more generous and accessible but demand that free medical and dental care for illegal 
immigrants be cancelled. The party claims that there is a ‘contradiction between welfare and 
multiculturalism’, and that national values must be preserved in order to defend the welfare 
state. Immigrants must thus be excluded from welfare benefits (2013). As of now, we cannot 
say whether there is contagion from the (populist) right to (non-populist) centre-right 
parties. Some parties – for instance Liberal Alliance (DK), Socialist Venstre (N), 
Arbeiderpartiet (N) and the Moderate Party (SWE) – appeal to migrants specifically. In 
Norway and Sweden, the adaption of positions from the populist right is a more recent 
phenomenon than in Denmark, where a shift from ‘welfare nationalism’ to a ‘culturalization’ 
of the integration debate started as early as the 1990s (Petersen and Jønsson, 2012: 97-99, 
123-142) and where Venstre and the Social Democrats increasingly cater to the Danish 
People’s Party. Still, results in Figure 1 show that direct references to migrants are rare (<5%) 
for all party groups and less often substantiated with policy appeals than other appeals. 
In sum, the general finding is that parties still make substantial policy proposals and 
still address concrete policy problems, although there are also indications that the way 
parties address these challenges are not so different across the left-right spectrum.   
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Overall – with regard to the two approaches that mark the extremes in Table 1 – we find 
only partial support for the constrained partisanship model and very limited support for 
cartelization (again, at least with regard to the implications for group appeals we focus on 
here). We found little evidence that directly supports the constrained party model, 
according to which we should either find appeals to specific groups like sociocultural 
professionals, business-finance professionals, low-skilled workers or the petty bourgeoisie, 
or policy packages that help forge electoral coalitions between the parties that represent 
them. We find references that are in line with the social investment focus that both the 
sociocultural professionals and the business-finance professions favour. However, these 
groups are not explicitly mentioned, and the Scandinavian parties do not differ in their 
declared support for lifelong learning and education to master the knowledge economy or 
for policy measures that help reconcile work and family life. Importantly, this does not mean 
that party competition has become meaningless. By contrast, the majority of the group 
appeals by parties is substantiated with aims and policy instruments. Likewise, a closer 
reading of our result tables indicates that parties still try to address societal problems. 
 
5. Conclusion  
We contribute to the literature on party appeals to social groups by introducing a new 
dataset on party-political appeals in Scandinavia in the period 2009–2015. In addition to 
coding to what social groups parties appeal, we collected information on what policies 
parties offer for the groups they mention and what goals and instruments they specify for 
such policies. The latter addition makes it possible to present new insights on the extent to 
which policy/group appeals are actually substantial and meaningful. 
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Our discussion of the relevant theories and the presentation of the data is structured 
by three guiding questions: 1) which groups do parties explicitly appeal to; 2) how 
substantial and meaningful are these appeals, and 3) to what extent do parties differ in their 
(meaningful) appeals? Against the background of seven theoretical perspectives on party-
group linkages that we found to be relevant and our take on parties and middle-class 
support in the Scandinavian universal welfare state we find the following. 
First, there are very few appeals to class in general and to the middle class in 
particular. Instead, we find many appeals to demographically defined groups, a finding that 
is in line with evidence on the UK as presented by Evans and Tilley (2017) and Thau (2019).  
Second, and different from recent findings in the literature, we observe frequent 
appeals to a category we label ‘all’ (in line with what Thau 2018: 183 finds for the Danish 
Social Democrats). Combining the information on the appeals to ‘all’ with our new data on 
instruments and aims that parties specify, we conclude that references to ‘all’ almost 
exclusively concern the characteristics of the universal welfare state: education, healthcare 
and the inclusive labour market. We infer from this that – given the broad middle-class 
nature of Scandinavian society – referring to ‘all’ is, for all intents and purposes, the 
functional equivalent of a middle-class appeal. 
Third, and specifically relevant for Scandinavia, we find that there is (still) a 
remarkably broad welfare state consensus among left and right parties. This consensus 
concerns four policy statements that most parties make: customize healthcare by allowing 
more individual choices; make work pay; prepare people for lifelong learning; provide better 
jobs. 
The conclusion is that there is only modest evidence for the two extremes of the 
seven relevant theories we discussed. First, we did not find evidence for the complex 
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realignment and adjustment strategies emphasized in the constrained party model. Because 
Scandinavia is a most likely case for this theory, it is unlikely that we will find such complex 
realignment and adjustment strategies elsewhere. Second, because the majority of the 
appeals to groups we coded are also substantiated with policy instruments and goals, our 
data do not support the cartelization proposition either. Because this theory also singled out 
Scandinavia as the most likely case and we did not find party competition to be shallow and 
completely devoid of meaning here, it is unlikely that this is the case elsewhere. 
The general conclusion, which is broadly relevant beyond the Scandinavian context, 
is that there is no clear evidence for the specific group orientation of parties that the 
constrained partisanship literature conjectures nor much support for the cartelization 
literature’s supposition that party competition has become entirely empty. While the 
complexities of coding and summarizing group appeals forced us to focus on new data, 
future studies should assess whether this conclusion and our specific findings, such as the 
dominance of demographic groups and frequent appeals to all, also apply to earlier periods. 
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